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For most of the time since 1995, the Japanese price level has declined. 
Since early 1999, short-term interest rates have mostly remained near
zero. Also, starting in 2001, the excess reserves held by banks have risen 
dramatically. Many observers have concluded that central banks are 
powerless to end deflation when short-term interest rates are near zero. 
This paper argues that such a pessimistic conclusion is unwarranted.
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DO NOT REPRINT OR REPRODUCE WITHOUT PERMISSION.1. Nothing in this paper is critical of Japanese monetary policy. Real GDP grew steadily in 2002 and 2003 at a rate
of almost 3 percent, while the consumer price index (CPI) remained basically stable in 2003. The unemployment
rate fell. The BOJ confronted many shocks in the 1990s: the sharp fall in equity and land prices that began in
1990 and the accompanying rise in the nonperforming loans of banks, the autonomous rise in the price level due
to the increase in the value-added tax in April 1997, and the collapse of the IT boom in 2000. One can argue that
Japanese monetary policymakers have done well in difficult circumstances.
I. Introduction
Since the early 1980s, a remarkable change has occurred in the political and popular
consensus about central banks. According to the new consensus, central banks should
control inflation. They should do so without wage and price controls and various
forms of moral suasion and government interference with private price setting. They
should possess “instrument independence” to change the interest rate by whatever
amount necessary to control inflation.
However, the recent deflationary experience of Japan has weakened the consensus
about the extent of central bank control over deflation. Central banks can control
inflation because there is no limit to how high they can raise their instrument, the
interbank rate. But can they control deflation? Is there not a fundamental asymmetry
that derives from the central bank’s inability to push the interest rate below zero?
This debate reveals a continuing lack of intellectual consensus over how central
banks determine the behavior of the price level. Opinion splits over the fundamental
issues of the nature of the price level and of the monetary transmission mechanism.
First, is the price level a monetary phenomenon determined by the way that the 
central bank controls money creation? Alternatively, is it a non-monetary phenomenon
determined by a multiplicity of real factors that exercise their influence on the price
level directly rather than indirectly through their effect on the money stock and real
money demand? Second, does the central bank exercise its control over prices through
money creation that forces portfolio rebalancing by the public? Alternatively, does it
exercise its control through influence over financial intermediation?
In this paper, I argue against the view that Japanese deflation reveals an asym-
metry in the ability of central banks to control inflation and deflation.
1 The issue of
whether central banks can control deflation when the short-term interest rate is zero
is the same as the issue in the 1970s over whether central banks can control inflation.
If inflation is a monetary phenomenon and portfolio rebalancing propagates the
monetary policy actions of the central bank, then control over money creation
endows the central bank with the power to control deflation as well as inflation.
If inflation is a monetary phenomenon, the price level varies to give the nominal
money stock the real purchasing power desired by the public. Because the central
bank retains control of money creation, it retains the ability to end deflation even
when the short-term interest rate is zero. The transmission mechanism of monetary
policy remains intact. The central bank can still force portfolio rebalancing through
the money creation that comes from open market purchases of illiquid assets.
This quantity theory view (Hetzel [2004]) contrasts with the popular “liquidity”
view that holds that the central bank is impotent to end deflation after it has lowered
the interest rate to zero. Because the lessons of the Japanese experience depend upon
what monetary policy the Bank of Japan (BOJ) has followed, I examine BOJ monetary
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policy. I also propose a quantitative strategy for stabilizing the price level that makes
the monetary base depend upon nominal variables like money growth and the yen
expenditure of the public.
II. The Liquidity View
The liquidity view interprets monetary policy in terms of financial intermediation.
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“Liquidity” refers to the availability of funds (credit) rather than the services yielded
by the quantity of money. The role of the central bank is to regulate the availability
of funds to banks to encourage the appropriate amount and direction of financial
intermediation. Monetary policy is easy if funds are readily available for lending.
From this perspective, asset prices and especially speculative activity are central 
indicators for the central bank. Speculative activity, allowed to run unchecked, will
lead to a collapse of asset prices. The difficulty of dealing with the resulting excessive
debt and inventories leads to recession and deflation. Swings in asset prices and 
their amplifying or depressing effects on financial intermediation can overwhelm 
the ability of central banks to control the price level.
From this perspective, an explanation of Japanese monetary experience after 1990
begins with the collapse of the “bubble economy.” In the last part of the 1980s, 
perhaps encouraged by an overly easy monetary policy, land and equity prices rose to
unsustainable heights. The decline in asset prices with the “bursting of the bubble” 
limited the ability of banks to extend credit. The common practice of collateralizing
loans with land led to the nonperforming-loan problem. Banks were slow to recognize
this problem because of the assumption that asset prices would recover and make 
troubled loans viable again.
The rise in nonperforming loans entailed two consequences for bank behavior.
First, banks ceased reallocating capital from unproductive to productive sectors of 
the economy. As a result, productivity growth fell significantly. Failure by banks to
foreclose on nonperforming loans prevented the restructuring of the economy that
leads to growth.
Second, banks became risk-averse. Even though the central bank provided ample
liquidity, banks were unwilling to extend credit to new enterprises. Instead, they
invested in safe assets, especially Japanese government bonds (JGBs). In February
1999, out of a concern for the stability of the banking system that followed the 
insolvencies of two large financial institutions in fall 1998, the BOJ instituted the
zero interest rate policy of providing reserves at a near-zero call rate. Despite this
availability of funding, bank lending continued to decline. 
In March 2001, the BOJ initiated a “quantitative” easing policy. The reserves held
by financial institutions with the BOJ (current account balances, or CABs) grew 
subsequently from ¥4 trillion to ¥30 trillion in fall 2003. Proponents of the liquidity
view argue that the unprecedented level of CABs together with historically low money
(M2+CDs) growth provides evidence that the unwillingness of banks to extend credit
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transmission mechanism means that the BOJ is helpless to offset deflationary pressures
through traditional means. Given the failure of banks to expand lending despite ample
reserves provision, the BOJ must pursue unconventional measures to revive financial
intermediation. An example of such a measure is the decision made in fall 2002 to buy
stocks from banks. The idea is that, with fewer risky assets, banks will become willing
to resume commercial lending.
III. The Quantity Theory
The dispute between the quantity theory and the liquidity view over whether the price
level is a monetary phenomenon reflects disagreement over the direction of influence
running between central bank money creation and prices. Figure 1 shows inflation and
money (M2+CDs) creation.
3Inflation fell from 6 percent at the beginning of the 1980s
to zero in 1987. A drop in oil prices and a rise in the exchange rate from ¥258 to the
U.S. dollar in 1985/I to ¥128 in 1988/I exaggerated the fall. Inflation rose near the turn
of the decade. Disinflation and subsequently deflation then prevailed.
Money grew around 8 percent in the mid-1980s. It grew around 11 percent in the
last part of the 1980s and then grew drastically slower starting in 1990. For most of the
1990s, money grew around 3 percent. Both money growth and inflation declined from
the 1980s to the 1990s. The exceptions to the common movements occurred after
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3. See Hetzel (1999) for a fuller discussion.
Figure 1  Change in M2+CDs and GDP Deflator
Percent Percent


















GDP deflator (left scale)
M2+CDs (right scale)
Note: Quarterly observations of four-quarter percentage changes in M2+CDs and
the GDP deflator. Heavy tick marks indicate the fourth quarter of the year.
Sources: Bank of Japan; Cabinet Office.1987, when the increase in inflation followed the increase in money growth with a lag
and then disinflation followed the decrease in money growth again with a lag.
The liquidity view and the quantity theory provide different explanations for the
common movements of the two series in Figure 1. Distinguishing between these two
explanations is complicated by central bank use of an interest rate instrument. One
often hears the expression, “When the central bank uses an interest rate instrument,
money is demand determined.” To understand the relationship between money and
prices, it is necessary to clarify the ambiguities in this observation.
According to the liquidity view, as a consequence of its interest rate target, the
central bank simply provides whatever money the public demands at a price level
determined by non-monetary forces. The quantity theory offers a more subtle expla-
nation. To begin, the interest rate possesses two components—a real rate and an
expectation of inflation (or deflation). If the price level is a monetary phenomenon,
each of these components imposes a discipline on the way that the central bank sets
its interest rate peg.
The real rate of interest functions as part of the price system to reconcile indi-
viduals to an unequal intertemporal distribution of consumption. A benchmark for
the real rate is the natural rate—the real rate of interest consistent with growth at the
economy’s potential. Money creation (destruction) allows the central bank to create a
temporary divergence between the real rate and the natural rate. Such money creation
forces the public into portfolio rebalancing.
The monetary acceleration at the end of the 1980s and the subsequent monetary
deceleration indicate a short-term interest rate that was, respectively, too low and too
high. Figure 2, which plots nominal output growth and a short-term interest rate,
offers information on the thrust of monetary policy. Nominal GDP growth possesses
two components: real output growth and inflation. Higher real output growth, if it
leads the public to expect higher growth, implies a higher natural rate because 
individuals see themselves as relatively better off in the future. Higher inflation, if it
leads the public to expect higher inflation, requires a higher nominal interest rate
through incorporation of an inflation premium.
Figure 2 shows how after the Louvre Accord in February 1987 the BOJ main-
tained the call rate unchanged while nominal GDP growth rose. Maintenance of the
prevailing interest rate despite a rise in the natural rate required money creation.
Initially, given the credibility that the BOJ had established by the mid-1980s for
price stability, money creation did not lead to higher inflation. Instead, the public
rebalanced its portfolio by buying assets like stocks and land. Higher asset prices 
created the additional demand for the real money created by monetary expansion.
Portfolio rebalancing accounts for the discrepancies observed between money growth
and inflation around 1990.
The BOJ responded more promptly after the business cycle peak in February
1991 than it did after the preceding trough of November 1986. Nevertheless, the
faster fall in GDP growth than in the call rate shown in Figure 2 indicates that the
monetary deceleration derived from maintenance of a real rate of interest higher than
the natural rate. The fall in real money, in asset prices, and in the expenditure of the
public reversed the events of the preceding monetary expansion.
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asset prices, which led to higher expenditure. Although money demand rose in line
with money supply, this situation was not a sustainable equilibrium. With a lag,
increased money growth led to inflation. The subsequent monetary deceleration
reversed these events. Inertia in the funds rate relative to cyclical movements in the
growth of nominal output produced changes in the money stock without prior
change in the public’s demand for real purchasing power. Ultimately, the price level
had to adjust.
In contrast, when the central bank both stabilizes the public’s expectation of infla-
tion at a level equal to its inflation target and sets short-term interest rates at a level
where the implicit real rate equals the natural rate, money creation and inflation
move together. A third variable, expected inflation, drives both money growth and
inflation. With credibility, the central bank controls expected inflation. The common
movement of money growth and inflation prior to 1987 and subsequent to 1993
suggests that in these periods the BOJ usually kept the real rate implicit in its target
for the overnight call rate equal to the natural rate.
Challenges to the quantity theory view that the monetary policy of the central
bank determines inflation concentrate on the two links between money creation and
prices. The first link is central bank control over money creation through control of
its acquisition of assets and, consequently, its liabilities (the monetary base). The 
second link is the ability of money creation to force portfolio rebalancing by the 
public. The theoretical possibility that the public simply absorbs additional money
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Figure 2  Nominal GDP Growth and the Call Market Rate
Percent
















Note: Quarterly observations of four-quarter percentage changes in nominal GDP.
Heavy tick marks indicate the fourth quarter of the year.
Sources: Cabinet Office; Bank of Japan; Haver Analytics.into its asset portfolio without attempting to move into less liquid assets is known 
as a liquidity trap. 
As shown in Figure 3, there is no unusual strength in real money demand in Japan.
That is, there is no evidence of a liquidity trap.
4 Challenges to the quantity theory then
must concentrate on the first link. That is, does the BOJ possess the ability to control
money creation? The answer to that question is unequivocally “yes.” A central bank can
increase bank deposits by simply buying an asset. The issue is whether the reserves-
money multiplier exceeds one.
5 That is, in response to an open market purchase made
independently of changes in banks’ demand for excess reserves, will bank deposits and
assets increase by a multiple of the increase in bank reserves? 
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Figure 3  Growth of Real Money
Percent




















Note: Quarterly observations of four-quarter percentage changes of M2+CDs divided 
by the CPI and the PCE deflator. Heavy tick marks indicate the fourth quarter 
of the year.
Sources: Cabinet Office; Bank of Japan; Haver Analytics.
4. This fact leaves unresolved the issue of what assets are good substitutes for money. At a zero short-term interest
rate, short-term liquid assets like Treasury bills are perfect substitutes for money. If the central bank purchases a
Treasury bill, it merely exchanges one asset (money) for another (a Treasury bill) that is a perfect substitute. In this
event, the public’s demand for money will increase. A liquidity trap exists only if a purchase of illiquid assets 
by the central bank produces no attempt by the public to eliminate the increased share in its portfolio of liquid 
relative to illiquid assets. A liquidity trap has never been observed.
5. It is important to distinguish between a liquidity trap, which concerns portfolio rebalancing of the public, and
bank adjustment to reserves changes, which concerns the behavior of the money multiplier. The first describes the
behavior of individuals, and the second describes the behavior of banks.IV. What Is BOJ Monetary Policy?
Resolution of the issue of whether open market purchases made independently of the
demand by banks for CABs would possess the leverage on bank deposits that comes
from a money multiplier greater than one will require a change in BOJ policy pro-
cedures. The high level of CABs held by financial institutions at the BOJ is striking.
However, the failure of a high level of CABs to stimulate money (M2+CDs) growth
does not indicate a failure of the monetary transmission mechanism caused by prob-
lems with bank solvency. Instead, it is a consequence of policy procedures that make
the monetary base depend upon the demand for excess reserves by banks rather than
upon the behavior of a nominal variable like money, nominal output, or the price level. 
A. Current Operating Procedures
BOJ operating procedures do not in themselves offer information capable of assessing
whether the increase in CABs occurred independently of an increased demand by
banks. Since fall 1997, the BOJ has followed a “dual operation” strategy of simultane-
ously absorbing reserves by selling short-term bills and providing reserves through
repurchase agreements with maturity often extending beyond the midpoint of the 
fiscal year or the fiscal year-end. The objective is to flatten the yield curve (Saito and
Shiratsuka [2001, section V]). For example, on August 25, 2003, the BOJ Desk
engaged in reserves provision by asking for bids on ¥800 billion in bill repurchase agree-
ments maturing on December 11, 2003.
6 Based on a competitive-bid criterion, the
Desk accepted 27 percent of the ¥2.9 trillion in offers. On the same day, it also engaged
in reserves absorption by offering ¥1 trillion in bill reverse repurchase agreements with
a maturity of September 3, 2003. It accepted 21 percent of the ¥4.7 trillion in offers.
Banks engage in the longer-term repurchase operations to arbitrage the small 
differences in the prices at which they buy from the market and sell to the BOJ. 
At a three- or four-month maturity, the price of a bill is low enough (the interest 
rate high enough) that the bank can purchase it in the market and resell it to the 
BOJ at a slightly higher price (lower interest rate). In its fund provision operations,
the BOJ Desk can choose an interest rate low enough to attract sufficient bids to 
provide whatever amount of reserves it desires. At the same time, it regulates reserves
absorption by controlling sales of Treasury and financing bills. These combined 
operations along with outright purchases of assets like JGBs allow the Desk to create
the amount of base money required to meet the BOJ Policy Board’s CAB target.
Unfortunately, these procedures offer no information on the issue of whether 
purposeful injections of reserves would entail a reserves-money multiplier effect. 
The policymaker needs to know whether the demand for CABs is inelastic or highly
elastic at a near-zero call rate. However, the motivation of the individual banks that
engage in open market operations offers no information about the nature of CAB
demand. The individual banks that offer the bills to the BOJ Desk in the latter’s
three- to four-month reserves provision operations do so to arbitrage the difference 
in interest rates at which they buy and sell the bills.
8 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/OCTOBER 2004
6. See the monthly table “Bank of Japan Operations in the Money Markets” (www.boj.or.jp).Furthermore, the individual banks that buy the bills from the BOJ Desk in the
reserves absorption operations do so in exchange for an asset that often pays only 
0.001 percent interest. In this transaction, the two assets, CABs and short-term bills, 
are almost perfect substitutes. From such exchanges, one does not learn whether the total
of CABs and short-term liquid assets is well defined. The BOJ cannot learn from these
exchanges whether it can spur asset acquisition by banks by altering the ratio of illiquid
assets to the total of liquid assets (CABs plus short-term securities) held by banks.
B. The BOJ Strategy for Monetary Base Provision
The high level of CABs prompts statements like “orthodox monetary policy has failed.”
Such statements assume that the BOJ’s open market purchases conform to the textbook
example of purchases made independently of the demand by banks for reserves. The
implicit assumption is that the high level of CABs implies a reserves-money multiplier
equal to one and, consequently, the need for large reserves injections to spur money
growth.
7 However, the procedures the BOJ Policy Board uses to determine the level of
CABs do not provide the kind of “experiment” necessary to make such an assertion. 
The reason is that the procedure the Policy Board uses to set its CAB target makes
CABs demand determined. In particular, the Policy Board has raised its CAB target
as necessary to maintain the short end of the yield curve flat. The “quantitative” 
policy adopted in March 2001 retains a fundamental continuity with the earlier 
policy adopted in fall 1997.
8 Stated alternatively, the Policy Board has not made the 
quantity of CABs a function of a nominal variable like nominal expenditure growth,
money growth, or misses in an inflation target. Only the latter supply-determined
open market operations could decide the ease with which the BOJ can push banks
off their demand schedule for reserves and revive their asset acquisition. 
As background for a discussion of the BOJ Policy Board’s strategy for increasing
CABs, it is important to understand the behavior of CAB demand by banks. Figure 4
shows the behavior of CABs. They increased steadily after September 2001, fell back
for a while in 2002, rose steadily again starting around the end of 2002, and then
rose moderately beginning in the middle of 2003. Figure 5, which shows loans in the
call market, offers an explanation for the behavior of CABs. 
Banks have two sources of reserves to meet unanticipated reserves outflows: the
excess reserves they inventory and the reserves they borrow in the call market. The
latter source has largely disappeared because the transaction costs exceed the interest
earned on lending in this market. When the call rate dropped below 0.25 percent 
in November 1998, lending began to decline. It revived for a while after the call 
rate rose to 0.25 percent when the BOJ abandoned the zero interest rate policy in 
August 2000. It then fell again with the restoration of a near-zero interest rate with
the quantitative easing policy adopted March 2001.
9
Price Stability and Japanese Monetary Policy
7. With M2+CDs equal to ¥686.4 trillion in January 2004, a 4 percentage point increase in the rate of growth of
M2+CDs would require an initial annual increase in the monetary base of ¥27.5 trillion—a 25 percent increase.
8. The spirit of these operating procedures is reminiscent of the free reserves procedures of the Federal Reserve in the
1950s. Meulendyke (1998, p. 36) wrote of the latter: “A relatively high level of free reserves was regarded as repre-
senting an easy policy: the excess reserves available to the banks were expected to facilitate more loans and investments.”
In that spirit, the BOJ wrote in its January 2004 Monthly Report of Recent Economic and Financial Developments,
“[M]oney market conditions continue to be extremely easy, as the Bank of Japan provides ample liquidity.”The rise in the CABs of banks does not indicate an increase in bank liquidity.
Banks have replaced one form of liquidity (access to the call market) with another
(excess reserves). Consider the analogy of a corporation with a line of credit at a
bank. The amount of liquid assets the corporation holds will increase if its line of
credit ends. Similarly, banks hold additional CABs to replace the liquidity formerly
offered by access to the call market.
9
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Figure 4  CABs at the BOJ
¥ trillions









Note: CABs and the BOJ targets. The latter, shown below, correspond to the two steps
and the shaded areas.
March 19–August 13, 2001:  ¥5 trillion 
August 14–September 17, 2001:  Around ¥6 trillion 
September 18–December 18, 2001:  Above ¥6 trillion 
December 19, 2001–October 29, 2002: ¥10–15 trillion 
October 30, 2002–March 31, 2003:  ¥15–20 trillion 
April 1–April 29, 2003:  ¥17–20 trillion 
April 30–May 19, 2003:  ¥22–27 trillion 
May 20–October 9, 2003:  ¥27–30 trillion
October 10, 2003–January 19, 2004:  ¥27–32 trillion
January 20, 2004–: Around  ¥30–35 trillion
Heavy tick marks indicate the last month of the year.
Source: Bank of Japan.
9. The behavior of U.S. banks in the Depression provides a precedent. In January 1936, with a Treasury bill rate of
0.1 percent, Federal Reserve member banks held US$3 billion in excess reserves compared to US$2.7 billion in
required reserves. As expressed in the metaphor of “pushing on a string,” contemporaneous observers inferred that
monetary policy was impotent. That is, banks’ excess reserves reflected a passive response to reserves inflows rather
than increased demand. The Fed, in effect, conducted an experiment to determine the validity of this assumption.
Between August 15, 1936 and May 1, 1937, the Board of Governors raised the reserve requirements on demand
deposits at large money center banks from 13 to 26 percent. If banks had not desired to hold those excess reserves,
the Fed’s actions would have been without consequence. In the event, they produced a drastic response. By May
1937, the Treasury bill rate had risen to 0.65 percent. From 1933/IV through 1936/IV, M1 growth had averaged
an annualized 15.7 percent. The level of M1 then declined from the end of 1936 to mid-1938. A strong economic
recovery turned into a second recession.The increase in CABs occurred in the context of weakening bank stock prices and
uncertainty over the health of some financial institutions. For Japanese banks and
corporations, the end of the fiscal year on March 31 and the middle of the fiscal year
on September 30 are critical days. The settling of accounts on these days has the
potential to reveal a significant corporate bankruptcy. Such an event could impair the
capital of the bankrupt corporation’s main bank.
The resulting uncertainty created about the capital adequacy of banks creates the
potential for a sudden, large reserves outflow. Banks engage in billions of dollars of
transactions in an hour’s time. If the participants in these transactions cease crediting
the accounts of the suspect bank but continue debiting its accounts, the bank could
experience enormous reserves outflows during a day. If the bank experiencing reserves
outflows goes into the call market to borrow a large amount of money, it risks having
a thin market turn against it. A large transaction undertaken at a rate above the 
going market rate would add to market rumors. Furthermore, the call market is the
least liquid on the fiscal year-end and mid-year dates when banks are likely to need
liquidity the most. The reason is that banks publish the figures on their balance
sheets for those days. Under the Basel Capital Accords, they must hold Tier I capital
against their interbank lending.
Given this uncertainty and given the low cost of holding reserves, banks maintain
large amounts of reserves. When banks increase reserves demand in a period of 
financial stress, they leave the call market. The call market becomes even less liquid
11
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Note: Monthly observations of average outstanding loans in the call market. Heavy tick
marks indicate the last month of the year.
Source: Bank of Japan.and less satisfactory as a source of funds to meet a large emergency demand. The
demand for reserves then ratchets upward. 
In the Minutes of the Monetary Policy Meeting on January 15 and 16, 2002, a
member of the BOJ Policy Board explained:
[T]he Bank had been able to increase the outstanding balance of current
accounts at the Bank . . . because (1) there had been concerns about the stabil-
ity of the financial system since autumn 2001, (2) liquidity demand surged in
preparation for funding beyond the calendar and fiscal year-end, and (3) the
intermediary functions of the money market declined due to the extremely
low interest rates.
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The annual summaries in the BOJ’s Market Review, “Money Market Operations
in FY2001” and “Money Market Operations in FY2002,” chronicle the operations of
the Open Market Operations Division. These reports reveal a pattern behind signifi-
cant increases in CABs. In each case, there was an increase in uncertainty in financial
markets followed by a slight upward tilt in the yield curve. The Policy Board then
increased the target range for CABs to make the yield curve flat again at a near-zero
rate for short maturities extending out several months to half a year.
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The first sustained increase in CABs began after the September 11 terrorist attacks
in the United States:
This led to an increase in precautionary demand for liquidity and financial
institutions increased their cash balances....[Yields] of instruments maturing
beyond the end of September firmed....In late November [2001], precaution-
ary demand for funds strengthened again when some money market funds
experienced significant withdrawals of funds following the collapse of Enron.
12
Another increase in CABs occurred toward the end of 2002:
Moving into October, uncertainty over the outlook for the financial system grew
and a sharp fall in stock prices centered on the leading banks occurred. Market
participants became more risk averse in the money markets. Market participants
with a fund shortage took steps to procure funds, while those with fund surpluses
held back from investments in the money market, choosing instead to hold their
funds at the Bank....[The] future date settlement transactions rate and the 
rate of term transactions such as repo and TB/FB transactions rose slightly. In
response to this situation, the Bank stepped up its fund providing operations so
as to enhance stability in the financial markets.
13
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10. Bank of Japan (2002a).
11. The exceptions are the increases in the CAB range that occurred on October 10, 2003 and January 20, 2004.
They were apparently undertaken to emphasize the BOJ’s commitment to maintaining the policy of quantitative
easing. The first increase resulted in no significant increase in CABs. As of early February 2004, the second
appeared to have produced an increase in CABs.
12. Bank of Japan (2002b).
13. Bank of Japan (2003b).V. A Proposal for a Quantitative Strategy
A transparent monetary policy requires both an explicit target and an explicit strategy
for achieving the target. A complete quantitative policy involves not only a price level
target, but also a procedure for changing the instrument (the monetary base or
CABs) in response to misses in the target.
A. The Case for an Explicit Target
Achievement of credibility for price stability is one way of providing a nominal
anchor for monetary policy. Credibility comes from having a clear, explicit target for
the price level and from a demonstrated willingness by the central bank to move its
instrument by whatever amount is necessary to achieve the target. Because Article 2
of the Bank of Japan Law mandates “the pursuit of price stability,” the target is clear.
This explicitness is important for influencing the behavior of asset prices during the
process of ending deflation. Either continued expected deflation or inflation creates
problems.
On the one hand, if monetary policy becomes stimulative in an environment of
expected deflation, portfolio rebalancing could cause asset prices to rise to unsustain-
able levels. On the other hand, if the public comes to expect inflation rather than
price stability, the prices of long-term bonds (JGBs) will fall significantly. A precipi-
tate attempt by banks to unload their JGBs could produce a decline in their price
sufficient to threaten some of the banks with insolvency. The foreign exchange rate of
the yen might also depreciate sharply and unpredictably.
B. Coping with the Zero-Bound Problem
Current monetary policy procedures do not make CABs depend upon a nominal
variable like money, nominal output, or the price level.
14 Consequently, they do not
provide a reliable way of providing a nominal anchor by controlling the public’s
expectation of the future price level. 
The willingness of the BOJ to supply the amount of reserves that banks demand
at a near-zero, flat short-term yield curve creates the impression that monetary 
policy is easy. The high level of CABs reinforces this view. In fact, the expectation of
deflation can make monetary policy restrictive. Figure 6 shows the implied one-year
real interest rate interest calculated as the yield on a 10-year JGB with one year 
to maturity minus one-year-ahead inflation forecasts from the Daiwa Institute of
Research (DIR).
15 Monetary policy appears easy in that the central bank makes 
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14. Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) argue that with a zero short-term interest rate the BOJ can pursue a more stim-
ulative monetary policy by committing to hold short-term rates at zero for a longer period. However, their model
assumes complete credibility. Steady-state inflation is automatically equal to the central bank’s inflation target. 
15. The fall in the price of capital goods in general and IT goods in particular causes the GDP deflator to grow at a
slower rate than consumer price indices. Private capital investment is about 15 percent of GDP. The deflator for
private capital investment has fallen at an annual rate of about 4 percent from 2002/III through 2003/III
(Matsuoka [2003]).
Forecasts of CPI inflation imply a lower real rate of interest. Consensus Economics publishes consensus 
forecasts for Japan from about 20 banks and securities firms. In December 2001, 2002, and 2003, it reported
forecasts for CPI inflation over the following calendar year of –0.9, –0.7, and –0.3 percent, respectively. The CPI
(a Laspeyres index) has fallen less than the private consumption deflator (a Paasche index), which in turn has
fallen less than the GDP deflator.available to banks all the reserves that they demand. However, it can be contrac-
tionary if low money growth creates deflation and expected deflation creates a high
real rate of interest.
The zero lower bound problem can arise when expected deflation raises the real
rate of interest above zero at a nominal interest rate of zero. Expected deflation can
then place a positive floor on the real rate of interest that exceeds the natural rate of
interest. With an interest rate instrument, the central bank lacks a way of responding
directly to negative shocks that lower the natural rate. (This problem does not occur
if the magnitude of expected deflation is less than the natural rate of interest because
the economy is growing rapidly.)
C. Making the Monetary Base Depend upon a Nominal Variable
The BOJ Policy Board could use current operating procedures to increase CABs 
sufficiently to stimulate growth in money and nominal GDP. The BOJ Desk would
cease fund absorption operations and just do repurchase agreements to provide
reserves (beyond the amount provided by outright purchases of assets like JGBs). 
The problem is that the asset exchanges involved in these repurchase agreements are
between a completely liquid asset (bank reserves) and an extremely liquid asset (bills).
Repurchase agreements that replace a bill with a bank deposit in the portfolio of the
public provide little incentive for investors to move out of liquid assets into illiquid
assets like stocks and real estate. 
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Note: Quarterly observations of the one-year real rate of interest. The real rate is 
the difference between the yield on a 10-year JGB with one year to maturity 
and expected inflation. The latter is proxied for by four-quarter inflation (GDP
deflator) forecasts made by the Daiwa Institute of Research. Heavy tick marks 
indicate the fourth quarter of the year.
Sources: Daiwa Institute of Research; Bloomberg.Under the strategy proposed here, the monetary base and CABs would vary in
response to the behavior of nominal variables. In the first instance, those nominal
variables would be growth in money and nominal output. Ultimately, base money
would vary in response to deviations of the price level from its target. The BOJ Desk
would no longer engage in auctions of reserves where it accepts bids for reserves.
Instead, the total quantity of reserves would depend upon a target level for the assets
held by the BOJ. 
The BOJ Policy Board would instruct the Desk to purchase an amount of assets
that produces an amount of CABs to which banks must adjust. For example, on
November 14, 2003, financial institutions held ¥30.7 trillion in CABs. Given
October 2003 over October 2002 growth of M2+CDs of only 1.5 percent, under the
proposed procedures, the Policy Board would likely create a positive reserves gap by
specifying a target for CABs in excess of the ¥30.7 trillion figure. The magnitude of
the excess would depend upon whether bank deposits adjust one-for-one with an
increase in reserves or whether there is a reserves-money multiplier effect so that
deposits adjust by some multiple. 
A final change would be for the BOJ Desk to exchange all short-term, liquid
assets in its portfolio for illiquid assets like 10-year JGBs. Another example of illiquid
assets would be the shares of mutual funds that hold a basket of stocks that replicates
the behavior of the Tokyo Stock Price Index (TOPIX).
16 The Desk would conduct its
open market purchases and sales in these illiquid assets.
17
The reason is that at a near-zero call rate, for banks, CABs and short-term liquid
debt instruments like Treasury and financing bills are perfect substitutes. Similarly,
for the public, bank deposits and short-term assets are perfect substitutes. To make
the demand for CABs and bank deposits well defined, the BOJ must use illiquid
assets in its open market operations.
18
D. Indicators
Because of the lags between changes in monetary base growth and changes in the
price level, the central bank cannot use a simple feedback rule running from misses of
15
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16. To avoid issues of credit allocation, the BOJ would have the shares in individual companies voted in trust by 
the mutual fund. If the BOJ purchased shares from a number of such funds, no individual fund would have 
significant voting power for an individual company.
17. The BOJ would have to change from lagged reserves accounting for calculating required reserves to contempora-
neous reserves accounting. For the banking system to adjust reserves demand to a given amount of reserves 
supplied by the BOJ, a decline (increase) in the deposits of banks produced by asset sales (purchases) must lead to
a decline (increase) in reserves demand. That can only happen with contemporaneous as opposed to lagged
reserves accounting.
18. To change private behavior, the BOJ must engage in open market operations that change the proportion of 
liquid to illiquid assets in the public’s portfolio. The alternative is to create money without an asset exchange 
with the public. (There is then a wealth effect as well as a portfolio rebalancing or substitution effect from money
creation.) The BOJ could set a target for CABs and credit the deposit account the government holds with it by
whatever amount is necessary to achieve the target. CABs would increase when the government drew down its
account to purchase goods and services. The government could also use its deposits to finance transfer payments
to the public, but could not use them to retire short-term debt.
Even if the BOJ exercised complete control over its credits to the government’s deposit account, such a 
means of increasing the monetary base would raise questions about central bank independence. With the 
“benefits” of seigniorage so apparent, the government might be tempted to ask for legislation requiring a positive
inflation target.the price level target to changes in the monetary base.
19 The BOJ could use money
(M2+CDs) and nominal output growth as indicators.
Although the money demand function exhibits considerable stability, money
demand varies with a number of variables. For this reason, stable money growth is not
necessarily desirable. Because real money demand depends upon interest rates (the own
rate on M2 minus the market rate), wealth, and real output, the relationship between
money growth and inflation holds only over long periods of time. However, inflation
is a monetary phenomenon and ultimately higher money growth, initiated indepen-
dently of the variables that influence money demand, must lead to higher inflation. 
A revival of money growth will provide the first indication that stimulative monetary
policy is inducing a change in bank behavior. 
The estimated money demand function in Table 1 (slightly modified from Hetzel
[2003]) measures the impact on real money demand of changes in the determinants
of money demand. Figure 7 shows the within-sample simulated values and actual 
values of real M2 growth.
20 It is difficult to predict in advance what rate of growth of
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Table 1  Real Money Demand Regression, 1958 to 2002
 lnMt = .21 lnMt–1 + .55 lnGDPt – .036 ln(Rt –RMt)+ .36 lnWt – .32Et–1+  ˆ
(2.6)             (3.8)               (3.6)                        (4.5)          (2.7)
CRSQ = .84 SEE = 2.0 DW = 1.8 DF = 39
Note: The regression is in error-correction form. Observations are annual averages, except for
wealth, which is a year-end observation. M is M2+CDs divided by the personal consump-
tion expenditures price deflator; R is a rival interest rate paid on nonmonetary assets; RM
is a weighted average of the own rates of return paid on the components of M2; W is real
wealth.   ˆ is the estimated residual from a money demand regression in level form using as
independent variables GDP, (R − RM), and W. ln is the natural logarithm;   is the first-
difference operator. CRSQ is the corrected R-squared, SEE standard error of estimate, DW
Durbin-Watson, and DF degrees of freedom. Absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses.
The dates for the regression are determined by the availability of data on the compo-
nents of M2. Wealth data are available with a one-year lag. The Cabinet Office compiles
wealth and national income and product account (SNA) data.
From 1957 through 1965, the rival rate (R) is the interest rate on discounts of govern-
ment securities by banks with the BOJ (boj.or.jp/en/siryo/siryo_f.htm). Thereafter, it is a
modification of the series used by Sekine (1998). It is the highest interest rate from among
the following instruments: three-month (gensaki) repurchase agreements, five-year loan
trusts, five-year bank debentures (subscription and secondary market), and five-year postal
savings. The bank debenture series is included only through 1975. Before the beginning of
deregulation in the early 1970s, it is the only available series that fluctuates. In the early
1970s, the repurchase rate fluctuates, but less than the bank debenture rate. However, the
large inflow of funds due to speculation on yen revaluation may have biased downward the 
repurchase rate. The own rate on money (RM) is a weighted average of the own rates on
the components of money (demand deposits, time deposits, savings deposits, and CDs).
19. For example, because of the volatility of expectations, the BOJ will have trouble predicting how higher nominal
output growth arising from monetary stimulus will break down in the short run into higher real output growth
and lessening deflation (rising inflation).
20. Because wealth becomes available with a one-year lag, the estimation period extends only through 2002.money is appropriate during economic recovery. One problem is that fluctuations in
the current low value of the interest rate opportunity cost of holding M2 can cause
large percentage changes in the cost of holding M2 and thus in real money demand.
In the long run, money growth consistent with price stability must accommodate
the secular increase in real money demand due to factors like wealth and the
increased value of individuals’ time. Figure 8 shows the steady increase in the ratio of
money to nominal output. Money growth consistent with price stability will equal
the approximate 2 percent trend growth shown in Figure 8 plus the trend growth in
real output.
To achieve price stability, the BOJ must also make nominal output grow in line
with trend real output. A major issue is the trend growth rate of potential output,
which depends especially upon productivity growth. Hayashi and Prescott (2002)
estimate that total factor productivity (TFP) in Japan grew at an annualized rate of
0.3 percent from 1991 through 2000. Capital deepening allowed growth in produc-
tivity (output per worker) of about 1 percent. Updated figures for 2001–02 show
TFP growth of 1.54 percent. Perhaps restructuring has raised TFP growth. 
The sum of TFP growth of 1.5 percent, productivity growth due to capital deepening
of 1 percent, and a decline in the labor force of 0.5 percent yields a benchmark figure
for trend real GDP growth of around 2 percent.
21
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21. The Bank of Japan (2003a) estimates a lower potential growth rate of about 1 percent.
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Note: Predicted values are the within-sample simulated values from the regression 
in Table 1. Actual values are M2+CDs divided by the PCE deflator.Figure 9 shows real GDP per worker hour. Since 1968 (when the hours-worked
series becomes available), this measure of productivity has grown at an annualized 
rate of 2.6 percent, which is consistent with the figures suggested above. If trend real
GDP growth is 2 percent, faster growth would diminish unemployment. In the seven
quarters ending in 2003/IV, real GDP grew at an annualized rate of 3.4 percent, while 
the unemployment rate moved down from its peak value of 5.5 percent to 4.9 percent
in December 2003. The Consensus Economics consensus forecast of real GDP growth
in 2004 (made in February 2004) was 2.2 percent, with an unemployment rate of 
5.1 percent—an outcome consistent with 2 percent trend growth.
A contentious issue is whether deflation has lowered productivity growth. Figure 9
shows output per worker hour rising above trend in the period of exceptionally
strong growth in the latter part of the 1980s and then falling back to trend in 1997.
After 1997, growth in worker productivity fell below trend (but has risen recently).
As shown in Figure 10, economic forces keep real wages in line with worker produc-
tivity. (Otherwise, labor’s share of income changes.) If some inflexibility in nominal
wages has prevented full adjustment to deflation, corporations may have responded
by raising worker productivity through substitution of capital for labor.
Such substitution raises the capital-labor ratio and validates a higher real wage but
may be inefficient. Total hours worked have trended down from the beginning of 1998
through 2003 (from 2.65 to fewer than 2.55 billion hours). Since 1998, the average 
of scheduled hours worked has fallen 10 percent and the labor force participation 
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Note: Quarterly observations of the natural logarithm of M2/GDP. The trend line is from
the fitted regression 400ln(M2/GDP) =− 265 + 1.9T + ˆ  . T is a time trend. Heavy
tick marks indicate the fourth quarter of the year. GDP is SNA68 through 1979
and SNA93 thereafter.
Sources: Cabinet Office; Haver Analytics.19
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Figure 9  Real GDP per Worker Hour
1968 80 78 76 74 72 70 82 84 86 88 90 92
y = 57 + 2.6T









Note: Annual observations of 100ln(real GDP per worker hour). In the regression 
y = 57 + 2.6T, y is the natural logarithm of real GDP (1995 prices), andT is a
time trend.
Sources: Cabinet Office; Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and
Telecommunications.
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Note: Annual percentage changes in productivity and real wages. Productivity is 
calculated as real GDP/nonfarm hours worked. Real wages are calculated as
compensation of employees/GDP deflator/number of employees. Productivity
trend lines are for 1976–91 (2.5 percent) and 1992–2003 (1.7 percent).
Sources: Cabinet Office; Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and
Telecommunications; Haver Analytics.rate has fallen about 2.5 percentage points.
22 During this period, the ratio of private
fixed nonresidential investment to GDP has remained steady at about 15 percent 
(the value that preceded the rise in the mid-1980s). Furthermore, since the beginning
of 1998, employment of regular workers has fallen at about an annualized rate of 
1 percent while employment of part-time workers has grown in excess of 3 percent. The
substitution of part-time for full-time workers lowers the average wage rate, but may
lower productivity by replacing experienced with inexperienced workers (Figure 11).
Given the current economic recovery, another question is the magnitude of the 
negative output gap. The answer to that question determines how long the Japanese
economy can grow above its long-run potential. The Bank of Japan (2003a) estimated
the output gap at –10 percent in 2002/III. One way to measure the disappearance
of the output gap is to observe how quickly the unemployment rate approaches its
natural value. (The natural rate of unemployment is the value at which inflation
begins to rise.)
A Phillips curve (a scatter plot of observations with CPI inflation on the vertical
axis and the unemployment rate on the horizontal axis) for Japan is basically flat 
at unemployment rates above 3 percent. At unemployment rates below 3 percent,
inflation begins to rise. Three percent then is an estimate of the natural rate of 
unemployment. However, structural changes in the Japanese labor market such as
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Figure 11  Average Hourly Earnings and Ratio of Part-Time to Total Workers
¥ Percent



















Full-time workers’ hourly wages (left scale)
Part-time workers’ hourly wages (left scale)
Fraction of part-time workers (right scale)
Note: Monthly observations. Dashed series is number of part-time workers
divided by number of total workers. The discontinuity in the “fraction of
part-time workers” series arises from a change in the sample. Seasonally
adjusted by the Daiwa Institute of Research. Heavy tick marks indicate the
last month of the year.
Source: Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare.
22. The figures are from the Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications and the
Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare.increased voluntary quit ratios and a skill mismatch suggested by a rise in the job
offers-to-applicants ratio suggests that this number may be somewhat too low
(Matsuoka [2004]).
E. Issues of Political Economy
The Bank of Japan Law is silent on whether the BOJ should maintain a positive 
value of its capital account. (It does provide for retained earnings to be paid into a
reserves fund to offset capital losses.) For a central bank, maintenance of solvency 
is an institutional safeguard for protecting its independence. A central bank needs 
protection against political pressures to use its seigniorage revenues to buy the debt 
of insolvent firms and banks.
23 For this reason, it is natural that the BOJ should 
avoid the precedent of becoming insolvent. It would be hesitant to put large amounts
of assets susceptible to capital loss on its books because adverse price movements could
make its capital account negative. In particular, if the BOJ buys long-term JGBs, a rise
in interest rates associated with the end of deflation would create large capital losses.
Several options exist for dealing with this situation. Starting in 2004, the BOJ no
longer marked to market its JGB holdings. A rise in market rates would then not affect
the BOJ’s balance sheet. Of course, the BOJ would have to realize losses if it sold JGBs.
Such a situation could arise when short-term interest rates become positive and the 
call market revives. The current high level of CABs would then become excessive. 
In this situation, there is an alternative to selling JGBs. The BOJ could sell its own debt
(bills drawn on the BOJ, as provided for in Article 33 of the Bank of Japan Law) and
increase reserve requirements. The BOJ could also negotiate a response in advance 
with the Ministry of Finance (MOF). The BOJ and the MOF could agree publicly 
in advance that in the event of insolvency the BOJ would increase the percentage of
retained earnings until the reserves fund reached its normal level.
VI. Concluding Comment
The change in direction of U.S. monetary policy under Paul Volcker is instructive
(Hetzel [1986]). In 1979, expectations of inflation became unmoored and outraced
increases in the funds rate. Monetary policy did not provide a nominal anchor.
Before 1979, the predominant view within the Federal Reserve was that inflation
arose from a variety of non-monetary factors such as wage-push pressures and 
supply shocks raising the price of food and energy. The political system did not
assign to the Fed responsibility for the control of inflation, and the the Fed did not
seek that responsibility.
Volcker changed operating procedures to emphasize the Fed’s control over money
creation (Hetzel [1982]). He made the foundation of monetary policy the control 
of inflationary expectations. Credibility came only slowly. However, Volcker made
clear that he would raise the funds rate to whatever level was necessary to establish
21
Price Stability and Japanese Monetary Policy
23. Solvency is not an economic imperative. A central bank can always increase its assets simply through open 
market purchases.Fed credibility. In 1981, the funds rate rose to 21 percent. No one knew whether
financial markets could withstand the strain. In 1982, the U.S. economy entered into
its worst postwar recession. Unemployment rose to 9 percent. 
In 1983, inflation fell from 12 percent to 4 percent. The Volcker disinflation
exercised a profound influence on the political and intellectual environment. Prior to
this episode, the consensus held that maintenance of price stability required a socially
unacceptable level of unemployment. When the Fed brought the inflation rate down
and kept it down with only a moderate unemployment rate, the consensus changed.
Governments became willing to assign responsibility for price stability to central
banks and give them the independence necessary to achieve it.
Japan’s situation is now similar in many ways to that of the United States in 1979.
Japan has experienced deflation for a significant period. Changing expectations will
be difficult. However, to lay a solid basis for monetary policy, the BOJ must change
those expectations to conform to its objective of price stability. Volcker established
credibility by making clear that the Fed would raise the funds rate to whatever 
level was necessary to restrain money growth and lower the public’s expectation of
inflation. The BOJ could make clear that it is ready to expand its portfolio of illiquid
assets to increase the monetary base by whatever amount is necessary to revive money
growth, restore the expectation of price stability, and maintain price stability.
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